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Public Choice Theory and the Privatisation of Prison Management 
in New Zealand -A "Prisoners' Dilemma"?l 
Privatising the prisons is not like any other privatisation. The question of who runs 
the prisons is on an entirely different scale from that of who runs the telephone 
service or empties the dustbins. 2 
I INTRODUCTION 
2 
There have been significant reforms in the area of Corrections over the past decade. 
One of the most high profile of those reforms has been the decision to allow the 
private management of some of this country's penal institutions.3 While privatisation 
is often the most publicly debated issue, consideration can not be given to it without 
looking at several interrelated reforms. 4 Associated reforms have seen the Department 
of Corrections split from the Department of Justice, and the inception of an internal 
funder/provider split that allows for the Department's continued delivery of penal 
institution management in a newly competitive environment. 
Firstly venturing into an analysis of the "economic liberalism" that has fuelled the 
broader reforms in the public sector in the 1980s and 1990s, this paper aims to see 
whether the reforms in penal institution management fit squarely within that 
framework. 5 An analysis of public choice theory and its impact on public law is 
1 This paper represents the personal views of the writer. The term "prisoners' dilemma" comes from an 
economic game theory discussed later in this paper. 
2 Stephan Shaw "The Short History of Prison Privatisation" in the (1991) 87 Prison Service Journal 32 . 
3 "Penal Institution" is defined in the Penal Institutions Act 1954 to mean "any prison, corrective 
training institution, or police jail established under this Act." 
4 The exact nature of privatisation is discussed at some length in the body of this paper. It can be 
summarised for the reader at this stage to amount to the contracting out of penal institution management 
to private enterprise. 
5 The term "economic liberalism" is borrowed from the title of a book by David Henderson The 
Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (Jenkin Buxton 
Printers, Victoria, 1999). 
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looked at with in-depth consideration given to the positive and normative implications 
of the theory on the traditional State monopoly of penal institution management. 
Looking at the issues from both a positive and normative economics approach means 
thought is given to whether privatisation addresses many of the problems public 
choice theory suggests exist in a monopoly delivery of penal institution management, 
or whether one set of concerns has merely been replaced with another. 
What is pivotal to this paper is the constitutional relationship of State and citizen. It is 
in considering this relationship that an attempt is made to distinguish the outcome of 
the reforms to the Department of Corrections from the move towards privatisation. 
The constitutional relationship is significant in the writer' s investigation of notions of 
fairness and the symbolism associated with the State administering justice. These 
provide possible reasons for why a State monopoly has traditionally existed and raise 
questions about what has changed. The question arises whether the frameworks 
introduced by the reforms guard against the potential long-term concerns raised by 
privatisation? 
The writer explores the anxiety that there is something undesirable about the profit 
motive being associated with the deprivation of individuals ' liberty. The Penal 
Institutions Amendment Act 1994 and the influence of agency theory provide some 
material for consideration in this respect. The writer aims to consider whether 
economics and justice need be mutually exclusive, or can co-exist as outcomes in the 
area of management of penal institutions. By questioning some of the presumptions 
of public choice theory, this paper seeks to use penal institution management as a 
model for investigating whether economic justifications require a conscious disregard 
for economically unquantifiable components, and whether that leads to unfairness and 
inequities. To that end consideration is given to Jonathan Boston' s comment that: 
Once we abandon the assumption that politicians, bureaucrats and voters are entirely self 
interested, the problem of capture need no longer occupy centre stage (though of course it 
should not be ignored). Thus, rather than constantly trying to immunise the political system 
against so-called vested interests, the more important policy question is ensuring that the 
4 
decision-making arrangements are open and fair (i.e. that they provide an opportunity for all 
interests to be heard)."6 
The writer asks do we need to abandon a public choice perspective to ensure that 
fairness, openness, and equity remain as part of the delivery of penal institution 
management in New Zealand, and then considers whether this is the issue on which 
individuals should even be focusing. It is the writer's concern that such questions may 
indeed be a distraction from more important questions about the constitutional 
relationship of the citizen and the State. 
6 Jonathon Boston The State Under Contract (Bridget Williams Books Ltd, Wellington, 1995) 1. 
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11 THE REFORMS -THE PLAIN FACTS 
As well as looking at the legislation that enabled privatised penal institution 
management, this section of the paper looks at the creation of the Department of 
Corrections as a separate entity, and the funder/provider spilt formed within the 
Department.7 These reforms are interrelated and a useful analysis of privatisation can 
not be considered without comprehensively describing the surrounding reforms. 
A The Decision to Privatise 
In November 1992 the National government announced that the future of penal 
institution management in New Zealand would include the privatisation of some of 
this country' s penal institutions. The announcement came after a Cabinet Strategy 
Committee substantive approval in October of that same year verifying the strategy for 
contracting out penal institution building and management to the private sector. With 
some haste, and even before enabling legislation was introduced by Parliament, the 
government had narrowed the 53 original showings of interest in managing and 
building penal institutions down to just six parties who would be invited to tender for 
the design, building and contract management of certain prisons.8 
On 28 July 1999 a contract was signed with Australian Correctional Management Pty 
Ltd ("ACM") allowing them to undertake contract management of the Auckland 
Remand Centre. The tender was awarded to ACM ahead of three other tenders 
including the Public Prisons Service. The anticipated opening is in May 2000, with 
the institution likely to be running at full operational capacity by October 2000.9 
7 These are by no means the only significant reforms that have taken place within the Corrections 
portfolio. 
8 The six successful showings of interest were: Australian Correctional Management, Corrections 
Corporation of New Zealand Consortium, Civil and Civic, Fletcher Construction/Group 4 International, 
McConnell Dowell/Corrections Services Group, and Serco Corrections. 
9 Department of Corrections Fact Sheet Managing Prisons on Contract (Wellington, 1999). 
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Tenders will be called for the Northland regional prison in 2001 and a new Auckland 
regional prison in 2003. 
B The Penal Institutions Amendment Bill 1994 
Legislative amendment was required to enable management of penal institutions to be 
delivered by private providers and came in the form of the Penal Institutions 
Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1993. Introduced to the House in May 1993, the Penal 
Institutions Amendment Bill (No.3) 1993 was not passed until 8 December 1994. 10 
The delay was largely due to the interruption of the 1993 election and the slim two-
seat majority held in Parliament at that time. 11 
While at first glance the Penal Institutions Amendment Bill appears to be a significant 
and sudden change in policy direction, it was in fact foreshadowed by several less 
explicit moves towards privatisation in the area of Corrections. These examples of 
what the writer coins "low-key privatisation" range from the private delivery of 
inmates' health and dental care, to the contracting out of catering, laundry, educational 
and counselling services. 12 These low-key instances of privatisation do not impact on 
the issue of who has the right to deprive another individual of their liberty, because 
they relate only to the delivery of services. The minimal public resistance to 
privatisation in these areas of correctional services begins to highlight the distinction 
between privatising penal institution management, and privatising other correctional 
services. Who cleans inmates' laundry and examines their teeth does not encroach on 
the constitutional relationship that is seen to exist between the State and inmate, and 
therefore remains considerably less contentious than the privatisation of penal 
institution management. 
10 The Penal Institutions Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1993 came into effect by Order in Council in March 
1995. 
11 Eventually the Bill was passed with a majority of 41 votes to 36. 
12 None of these changes required legislative amendment to be undertaken. 
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C The Creation of the Department of Corrections 
One of the most significant reforms that is closely tied to the privatisation of penal 
institution management in New Zealand is the extrication of the Department of 
Corrections from what was originally a considerably larger and more diverse 
Department of Justice. 13 
I The Review 
It was a Review of the Department of Justice undertaken in 1994 ("the Review") 
which made recommendations that resulted in the establishment the Ministry of 
Justice, Department of Corrections, and Department of Courts as three separate 
entities. 14 The decentralisation of these core functions allowed each of the separate 
entities to act autonomously in providing agreed outputs to the newly responsible 
Ministers. 15 The Review commented that the Department of Justice in its pre-reform 
state "contributes to outcomes of importance to the government, namely the 
constitutional relationship between the State and the individual." 16 It is what the 
Review identifies as the constitutional relationship existing in relation to the 
administration of justice, that begs the question whether it is possible for reforms to 
take place in this area in the same way as they have in other aspects of the machinery 
of government. 
13 The Department of Corrections has sole responsibility for administration of the Penal Institutions Act 
1954, and the Penal Institutions Regulations 1961 (now repealed and replaced by the Penal Institutions 
Regulations 1999). It shares joint responsibility for administering the Criminal Justice Act 1985 with 
the Ministry of Justice and Department of Courts. 
14 Review of the Department of Justice - Stage One Report (30.9.94) and Report of the Court Services 
Review Committee (5.10.94) and Review of the Department of Justice - Stage Two Report (5 .12.94). 
15 "Output" is a term defined in the Public Finance Act 1989 to mean "the goods and services that are 
produced by a department, Crown entity, Office of Parliament or other person or body." With the 
creation of two new Cabinet portfolios came two new Ministers to whom agreed outputs were to be 
delivered, the Minister of Corrections and the Minister of Courts. 
16 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage One Report (30/9/94) 3. 
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2 Changes to the Machinery of Government 
The creation of the Department of Corrections as an independent department can be 
viewed as part of the wider changes to the machinery of government that were 
undertaken on a state sector wide basis. It was the view of Treasury at that time that: 
Because Departments have a vested interest in their own survival, they should not both advise 
their political masters and implement policy. Otherwise their advice will be biased and 
bureaucratic capture may occur. Consequently advisory, regulatory, and delivery functions 
should be separated and undertaken by different agencies.17 
The separation of Corrections from Justice can be seen to avoid the capture feared by 
the economists of the day. However the reforms did not stop at trying to stop capture, 
they also focused on performance. The performance of the Department of Corrections 
as with other departments, was expected to reflect the well established public sector 
management principles stemming from the Public Finance Act 1989 and State Sector 
Act 1988. These two significant pieces of legislation provided the context for the 
Review, essentially becoming the framework in which the restructure took place. 18 
The aim of reform was to ensure that with performance came "efficiency," 
"effectiveness," "accountability," and "flexibility. " 19 
Up until 1994, the Department of Justice had largely been immune from the impact of 
the wider state sector reforms. The Department of Justice ' s immunity has been 
formally attributed to its external compliance and accountability regime. It is of note 
that the Review also acknowledges that there existed in the Department of Justice a 
"reluctance or inability to implement change."20 The writer suggests that this 
reluctance may reflect the view that the administration of justice was not an area 
17 Boston, above n 6, 4. 
18 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage One Report (30/9/94) 11 . 
19 These buzzwords were used during the reforms and clearly reflect the influence of an economics on 
the government' s approach to the delivery of services. They are terms that are scattered through the 
Review of the Department of Justice. 
20 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage One Report (30/9/94) 4. 
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where economic reforms would be able to take place in the same way they had in 
other areas of the machinery of government. 
D Funder I Provider Spilt 
For the Department to instigate the notion of competitive delivery of services as the 
Penal Institutions Amendment Act allowed, the Review recognised the need for a 
funder/provider split to be take place. It stated that "the environment envisaged by the 
Penal Institutions Amendment Bill would require a more definitive purchaser/provider 
separation for public institutions."21 The Review identified the core business of the 
Department of Corrections as management of national corrections systems and went 
on to say that: 
This includes decisions about whether services are contestable, the development and 
management of contracts with both external and internal providers, and the management of 
service delivery ..... Management of both public and private provision will require separation of 
contracting and internal provision to provide a transparent and auditable contracting process.22 
The split has taken effect in the way the Review envisaged meanmg that the 
Department can be seen as two halves. On one side of the Department is the 
"provider" made up of the Public Prisons Service, Community Probation Service and 
Psychological Services. On the other side the "Funder" consisting of the Policy 
Development Group, Policy and Service Purchase and Monitoring Group, Strategic 
Development Group, Finance and Internal Audit Groups. 23 
21 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage One Report (30/9/94) 41. 
22 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage Two Report (5/ 12/94) 44. 
23 The "Funder" is often also referred to as the "Purchaser". 
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Ill PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
"Public Choice is not a subject; it is a way of studying a subject ... lt takes the tools of 
economics and applies them to the material of politics. "24 
Public choice theory is the application of economic discourse and reasoning to the 
structures and decisions making of entities that exist in non-market environments. It 
can be used to analyse the motives of decision-makers who are not part of the 
traditional competitive market through the gaze of economics. 
A A General Look at Public Choice Theory 
Starting from the premise that "economics is the study of rational choice in a world of 
scarcity"25 public choice theory presents the individual as a rational utility maximiser 
who makes decisions based on rational outcomes. Buchanan, one of public choice 
theory's masterminds has said that: 
... In one sense all of public choice or the economics of politics, may be summarised as the 
' discovery' and ' rediscovery' that people should be treated as rational utility maximisers in all 
their behavioural capacities.26 
Those unconvinced by the claims made by public choice theorists, consider the 
theory's "limited predictive power" to be a major obstacle.27 This criticism is based on 
a reluctance to accept Buchanan's exclusive notion that individuals "should be" 
treated as utility maximisers in their every capacity. Those who critique public choice 
theory consider it to be an implausible behavioural assumption that individuals act, 
and therefore should be treated in all respects, as utility maximising individuals.28 
24 Iain McLean Public Choice: An introduction ( Basil Blackwell Ltd, Great Britain, 1987) I. 
25 David W Barnes and Lynn A Stout The Economics of Constitutional Law and Public Choice (West 
Publishing Co, USA 1992) I. 
26 James Buchanan, "From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public 
Choice" in Boston, above n 6, 2. 
27 Boston, see above n 6, 13. 
28 Boston, see above n 6, 13. 
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This implausibility is substantiated for critics in the actions of individuals often being 
in direct contradiction to those of a self-interested utility maximiser. 
B Public Choice and Public Law 
From a public choice perspective public laws can be viewed as a way of managing and 
distributing the State's scarce resources. In this realm public laws and politics are 
closely and arguably inextricably interrelated. McAuslan emphasises the important 
corresponding nature of politics and public law when he says in support of the John 
Griffith's approach to public law that: 
The close and continuing connection between the political process and public law; how we can 
not hope to understand the real world of public law without at the same time understanding 
something of the real world of politics and government, how decisions are made, what influences 
are brought to bear on decision makers, how process affects policy and policy process, how 
public law and political process are in many respects two sides of the same coin.29 
It is this connection between public law and the political process that provides an 
explanation as to why public choice theory has been applied in the sphere of public 
law and not just in an academic sense. With an awareness of the scarcity of resources 
available under departmental budgets, and the drive to control and deliver public 
goods and resources in the most efficient and cost effective way, public law has begun 
to reflect the impact of public choice theory's concepts of scarcity of resources and 
self maximising rational individuals. 
Public choice theory has been used to focus on parties in the political arena as utility 
maximising individuals, viewing the actions of voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and 
lobby groups in terms of economically rationalised decision making. To this end 
public choice theory has provided its followers with a framework in which to predict 
the nature of certain law changes, as well as an analytical tool with which to explain 
29 Patrick McAuslan "Public Law and Public Choice" (1988) 51 MLR 681, 682. 
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inefficiencies in existing decision making structures.30 Since a public choice view of 
the law presumes that individuals such as legislators, bureaucrats, voters and lobby 
groups act to maximise their own interests, it assumes that all laws move towards 
those ends. From this point of view the law is seen as a framework in which 
individuals transact rather than a body of rules that exist to protect and serve the 
collective needs of society. 
A public choice theory analysis is viewed by the writer as a move away from the 
ideological view that the law generates justice and fairness, and as a move towards 
efficiency as the philosophy behind why laws exist. It is in this transition that the 
writer believes consideration must be given to whether an economic approach 
addresses the interests of all parties affected by the law and can therefore be seen as 
fair and just. A public choice theorist would say that the impact of efficiency on the 
law benefits all parties because anywhere that barriers to efficiency are removed and 
externalities are controlled there is a Pareto optimal result for the collective group. 
The Pareto optimal state represents a state in the economy where a certain decision 
makes no one person worse off, and leaves some individuals better off. It is the 
writer' s view that Pareto optimal results are not the same as equitable results and 
therefore an efficient outcome can not always be assumed to be fair. 
C Public Choice Theory and Economic Liberalism 
The fourth Labour government came into power after the snap election of 1984, and 
initiated reforms in the state sector that have been described as some of the most 
ambitious of their kind in the world. The discourse of public choice was used by the 
economic liberals of the time to analyse the machinery of government, and determine 
reforms in laws, and procedures that met the goals prescribed by the public choice 
30 McDowell and Webb, The New Zealand l egal System, Structures, Processes and l egal Theory 
(Butterworths, Wellington , 1998) 24. 
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theory. 3 1 Boston has said that at the time: 
The treasury's consideration of the existing machinery of government was heavily influenced by 
public choice theory, with its emphasis on the all - pervading phenomenon of self interested 
behaviour and the new economics of organisation .32 
Without a profit motive and where services were largely delivered in a monopoly 
environment, the economic liberal critique of the machinery of government saw the 
warning signs of inefficiency and cost ineffectiveness. In the monopoly environment 
public choice theory provided the foundations for critical analysis of the delivery of 
state services, including the State's monopoly delivery of penal institution 
management. 
It is the writer's observation that economic liberals have used public choice theory in 
two different ways. The first approach is primarily as positive economics, where 
public choice theory was used to verify observations of structures presently in 
existence. This is demonstrated in statements such as the State's monopoly 
representing a model where "quality is low, prices are high, and [where] supply has 
not kept up with demand."33 The second approach is a normative economics approach 
where public choice theory was used as a means to address the problems identified in 
a structure and describe the way things ought to be. In the circumstances of the 
broader reforms of the state sector it is difficult to entirely separate these two 
approaches. This is predominantly because public choice theory has been used to both 
describe the problems associated with the machinery of government in its pre-reform 
state, and furthermore to determine the characteristics of the reforms that needed to be 
3 1 Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble, David Caygill and Michael Basett represent for the writer the hard-
core group of politicians heavily influenced by the economic agenda of Public Choice Theory and 
Treasury of the day. 'Rogernomics ' the term used to describe their agenda is a colloquial term for the 
economic liberalism of the day. 
32 John Martin "The Role of the State in Administration" in Andrew Sharp (ed) Leap into the Dark: 
The Changing Role of the State in New Zealand Since 1984 (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1991)45 . 
33 Charles H. Logan Private Prisons: Cons and Pros (Oxford University Press, New York, 1990) 7. 
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and have been undertaken according to the economic agenda of the theory. The 
overlapping of the two approaches is demonstrated in Buchanan' s comment that: 
There are direct normative implications of public choice theory for issues of constitutional 
design ... In a very real sense, public choice theory offers a theory of 'governmental political 
failure ' that is on all fours with the ' theory of market failure ' that emerged from the theoretical 
welfare economics of the 1950's.34 
The writer endeavours to consider firstly, through a positive analysis, what were the 
"governmental political failures" a public choice theorist would have found in the 
monopoly delivery of penal institution management. Then in the following section 
look at the normative implications of public choice theory for issues of constitutional 
design. 
34 Buchanan "Political Economy 1957-82" in Patrick McAuslan "Public Law and Public Choice" 
( 1988) 51 MLR 681 , 685-6. 
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IV POSITIVE P UBLIC CHOICE AND THE STATE MONOPOLY ON PENAL 
INSTITUTION MA NAGEMENT 
This part of the paper looks specifically at what an economic liberal approach would 
have discovered in a positive economic analysis of the State ' s monopoly delivery of 
penal institution management through the use of public choice theory. The approach 
taken is to look at four different groups and determine what public choice theory 
would have assumed their actions to be in a State monopoly environment. 
A Bureaucrats 
The way bureaucrats are seen by public choice theorists is as "officials working 
permanently for large ... organisations in circumstances where their own contribution 
to organisational effectiveness can not be directly evaluated."35 It is because of 
individual bureaucrat ' s indirect link to the outcomes and organisational effectiveness 
of the State's delivery of services, that public choice theory sees that the State's 
monopoly delivery of penal institution management as lacking innovation and 
development. 
Niskanen has delivered one of the most influential hypotheses on the behaviour of 
bureaucrats associated with public choice theory. 36 In his hypothesis Niskanen 
suggests that bureaucrats act to maximise their own budgets, salary, prerequisites of 
office, public reputation, power, patronage and ease of the job. For him bureaucrats' 
sole motivation is self-interest, and there is no consideration of any possible altruistic 
motive on behalf of the public servant. The utility maximising bureaucrat produces, 
according to his view, the output level that yields the highest possible budget rather 
than the output level that maximises the difference between revenue and costs. An 
economic liberal would derive from Niskanen's hypothesis that the State' s traditional 
monopoly delivery of penal institution management could not be cost effective or 
35 Patrick Dunleavy Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (Harvester Wheatsheff, Great Britain, 
1991)148 . 
36 For a description ofNiskanen 's hypothesis see David Greenaway and G.K Shaw (eds) Public Choice, 
Public Finance and Public Policy (Basil Blackwell , Great Britain, 1985). 
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efficient because bureaucrats are acting to maximise their own interests not those of 
the bureaucracy for which they work. The problem with Niskanen's analysis is that it 
assumes that all bureaucrats have a degree of control over the budget with which they 
are associated. To this extent his analysis is clearly more applicable to the senior 
bureaucracy than the lower level public service. 
Logan presents another form of utility maximisation that can be seen to better reflect 
the motives of public servants at lower levels of an organisation. He points to the 
"convenience motive"37 which amounts to bureaucrats maximising their utility to 
undertake what is most convenient and therefore requires the least expenditure of 
effort. Such an approach leaves little expectation of innovative and creative 
development in a state monopoly service such as the management of penal 
institutions. For a public choice theorist it suggests that those in a bureaucracy like a 
prison environment would be taking the easiest options in the carrying out of their 
duties and actions. This is strong ammunition for the economic liberals because it 
suggests one of the problems associated which a State monopoly delivery of prison 
management is the lack of drive for innovation, change and improvement. 
Diiulio delivers an alternative approach to bureaucrats in the prison environment. It 
comes in the form of an altruistic motive driving the actions of public servants. 
Diiulio believes that only state servants can deliver prison services because only they 
are interested in and uphold the public good. What he refers to is a sense of social 
public good, something that a public choice theorist would not accept. Diiulio 
maintains that the existence of a "public interest" or a "common good" actually 
requires that the State and its servants deliver penal institution management, because 
they are the only body that can do so fairly. 38 
37Charles Logan " Propriety of Proprietary Prisons" [ 1987] Federal Probation 39. 
38 It is interesting to note that offices such as the Ombudsman and the Privacy Commissioner often look 
at "public interest" when determining the release of certain information. Under a public choice view 
that factor would not exist. A public choice theorist would suggest the "public interest" has been 
fabricated to legitimise the demands of rent seeking groups. 
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There is a clear tension between a public choice theory approach to bureaucrats in a 
state monopoly environment and an analysis such as Dilulio's that sees prison officers 
as unselfish servants of the public good. 39 Dilulio's approach disregards economic 
consideration and presumes a prison officer is driven by the goals of the community at 
large. A public choice theorist would not accept any such notion, preferring to see the 
bureaucrat as a self-maximising individual. 40 
B Politicians and Voters 
Public choice theory suggests that politicians act to maximise their own interests by 
focusing on matters such as re-election and retention of power, primarily through 
maximising their votes. This means politicians focus on areas of popular interest and 
delivering policies that please the largest number of voters. While everyone seems to 
have a view on criminals and crime, public choice theory would suggest that the 
average New Zealander is unlikely to vote based on the issue of the management 
structure of penal institutions, therefore implying politicians unlikely interest. 4 1 
Public choice theory assumes that voters will vote to maximise their own interests, not 
the interests of a third party or the community, unless they coincide with their own 
interests. This principle suggests that voters would definitely not vote for the interests 
of a criminal, as that would not be compatible with the individual maximisation of 
their own utility. As investors in the government, voters are unlikely to use their vote 
to pay out on an issue that does not directly relate to them. Therefore public choice 
theory suggests that voters have little or no interest in the delivery of penal institution 
management because it is not an area where they are able to maximise their own 
39 This tension is discussed at some length in the section of this paper titled "Qualities Exclusive to the 
State ' s Delivery." 
40 No assumptions have been made here by the writer about whether Dilulio's theory would apply to all 
other bureaucrats, because he makes no suggestion of this. The fact that his comments on the public 
good are limited to bureaucrats in a prison context suggests that be may have seen something distinctive 
about this area from all other state services. 
41 Length of inmates' sentences appears to be an issue of interest to voters , with recent extension in 
sentence lengths under the Crime Act 1961 , and with the referendum at the general election on length of 
sentence. 
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interests . Public choice theory would suggest that politicians would focus on matters 
such as penal institution management because they are aware that they are not vote 
winning issues. For a politician to take an interest in this area, public choice theory 
would suggest, is to act irrationally, lessening the ability to generate votes, and return 
to power by focusing on vote winning issues. 
C Rent Seeking Groups 
As a backdrop to the changes, it is useful to consider the public choice view of the 
rent seeking groups involved in penal institution management. In public choice terms 
rent seeking describes the political activity of individuals and groups who devote their 
scare resources to the pursuit of a degree of monopoly rights granted by government. 
I Inmate Rights Groups 
While there are groups who have an interest in inmate rights, a public choice positive 
analysis of these groups would suggest that individuals who belong to inmate interest 
groups are members only to serve their own interests; be it prestige, power or self-
interest of some other description. 42 Economic liberals would have found these groups 
to have no real power or potential to capture because of many of the reasons discussed 
in relation to politicians. Those who belong to such groups would not doubt refute 
such an assertion and claim their interests lie in civil liberties and public good, their 
motives altruistic in nature. Public choice theory is unrelenting in its assumption that 
all individuals, even those who appear to be altruistic, are in fact self-maximising in 
their actions. 
2 Private Interest Groups 
The types of rent seeking groups that would seek to end the State's monopoly of penal 
institution management are often associated with large business interests . For this 
42 Examples include the Prisoners Aid and Rehabilitation Society, The Howard League and the 
Movement for Alternatives to Prison Inc. 
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reason it is arguable from a public choice perspective that they may be better able to 
have political capture at the time before the reforms. This fear was expressed by those 
who did not support privatisation, when it was argued that private prison interest 
groups would become a huge lobbying force, potentially creating monopolies and 
eventually the inability to move away from privatisation if it were ever considered 
appropriate . The fear was that "private vendors can, by political and public influence, 
manipulate the highly undefined and sensitive goals of corrections to an interest in 
profits by these companies rather than the "public good."43 These rent seeking groups 
are seen by public choice theory to be interested in maximising their own interests 
through the generation of profits. 
43 M Janus " Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in Privatisation of Corrections in Private 
Prisons" in G . S Bowman, S Hawkin and P. Seindenstadt (eds) Privatising Correctional Institutions 
(Transaction, New Brunswick, 1993) 32 . 
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V NORMATIVE PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE REFORMS 
The writer now endeavours to look at the reforms in the area of penal institution 
management from a normative public choice perspective, and see if they present 
solutions to the problems identified by the positive analysis. Buchanan has said that: 
When persons are modelled as self interested in politics or in other aspects of their behaviour the 
constitutional challenge becomes one of constructing and designing frameworks , institutions or 
rules that will to the maximum extent possible limit the exercise of such interest in exploitative 
ways and direct such interest to the furtherance of the general interest.44 
The writer seeks to see if Buchanan' s "constitutional challenge" has been met through 
the changes that took place in the area of penal institution management. 
A The Problem with Politicians 
There is an assumption that the reforms introduced would act to address and limit 
some of the effects of an individual ' s self-maximisation including the self-maximising 
of politicians. Ironically individuals who the theory itself suggests would actually be 
acting in their own self-interest when introducing the legislative changes, are 
considered appropriate persons to introduce a framework to guard against their own 
and other individuals ' self-maximisation. Rather than controlling the self-
maximisation of politicians, the legislative reforms of the Penal Institutions 
Amendment Act 1994 can be viewed as allowing the Minister to move further away 
from this area, thus supporting rather than constraining their self interest. Such a 
reading is fuelled by the fact that it is the Secretary rather than the responsible 
Minister that enters in contracts for private delivery of penal institution management, 
thus meaning the Minister is not directly involved in the relationship. 
The potential concern about a group which public choice theory has tagged as self-
maximising, creating a framework that guards against their own self-maximisation is 
44 Buchanan "Liberty, Markets and State" (Brighton 1986) 22, in Patrick McAuslan "Public Law and 
Public Choice" (1988) 51 MLR 681 , 688. 
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articulated in the comments of Lianne Dalzeil in the parliamentary debates regarding 
the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994. She has said of the Minister of the day 
that: 
He puts himself even more at an arm's length from the problems than he was before. I would 
describe this as the Pontius Pilate approach-not taking seriously the responsibility of the 
Minister. One has to ask what the Minister does [?] Does he take his portfolio seriously? Why 
is he reducing his workload by putting these questions further and further away from his 
authority [?] 45 
The theory itself assumes that those who introduce legislative change or reforms do so 
to create a framework into which to challenge the self-maximising energy. 
Approaching the matter from this perspective it may be that the Penal Institutions 
Amendment Act does not meet the constitutional challenge of creating a framework in 
which to entice politicians to be interested in this area. It could be said that 
privatisation distances those who represent the State from the delivery of penal 
institution management, therefore stretching rather than reinforcing the constitutional 
relationship of citizen and State. 
B Bureaucrats and the Changes 
In terms of a normative public choice theory approach the Review and subsequent 
restructure of the Department of Justice can be seen as trying to ensure that Justice 
"caught up" with other areas of state sector reform. The Review focused delivery 
along the lines of the requirements of the Public Finance Act 1989 and sought a 
clearer definition of departmental outcomes and outputs. The focus was on efficiency 
and cost effectiveness, to ensure that scare resources were not wasted by self-
maximising individuals who were required to work in the non-profit realm of the State 
bureaucracy. 
45 29 November 1994 545 NZPD 5033. 
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I The Review 
The Review saw the outcome of the Department of Corrections as being "the 
enhancement of public safety by responding to crime in a firm, fair and equitable 
manner thereby contributing to a reduction in the incidence of crime."46 The outputs 
which were to be specified in relevant performance and purchase agreements were 
considerably less abstract, and far more easily measurable. These included the 
delivery of policy advice and the provision of custodial services. These measures and 
recommendations reflect the normative use of public choice theory and its framework 
as set out in the Public Finance Act 1989 and State Sector Act 1988. This legislation 
saw the Chief Executive and inadvertently all bureaucrats' salaries tied into the 
"efficient, effective and economical management of the activities of the Department," 
essentially creating an artificial profit motive. 47 
The reforms associated with the Department of Corrections can be seen as part of the 
reforms associated with the broader machinery of government. If you accept the 
assumptions of public choice theory regarding the self-maximising individual, the 
constitutional challenge referred to by Buchanan may have been met in the reforms of 
the Department. That is because a framework was created (Public Finance and State 
Sector Acts) in which to channel the self-maximising individuals' interests into the 
general interest of the Department, in the enhancement of public safety by responding 
to crime in a firm, fair, and equitable manner. However if one accepts the altruistic 
public servant presented by Dilulio, these changes may be seen to act to restrain rather 
than serve the general interest by tying bureaucrats to delivering outputs that are 
predetermined and are therefore potentially inflexible. 
2 No Impact on the Constitutional Relationship 
What is to some degree non-contentious about the reform and restructure of the 
Department is that in and of itself, it did not impact on the constitutional relationship 
46 Review of the Department of Justice: Stage One Report (30/9/94) 61 . 
47 S32 of the State Sector Act 1988. 
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between citizen and State. As goals of the reforms, cost-effectiveness and efficiency 
can be attained without unbalancing the constitutional relationship between the State 
and the citizen. For this reason they can be seen as potentially less problematic than 
the issue of privatisation where economics and the constitutional relationship meet 
head on. 
C Privatisation 
Privatisation in the context of penal institution reform more accurately amounts to the 
contracting out of penal institution management, as opposed to the full passing of 
government equity to commercial enterprise. Donahue makes a distinction between 
these two ends of the privatisation spectrum, when he explains that the first type: 
involves removing certain responsibilities, activities or assets from the collective realm. This is 
the chief meaning of privatisation in countries retreating from post-war, post-colonial 
experiments with socialism, as they separate factories , mines, airlines and railroads from public 
contract ... The second meaning [is] retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the 
private sector.48 
The Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 provides for the opportunity to delegate 
the delivery of penal institution management to the private sector from time to time, in 
the second manner referred to by Donahue.49 Privatisation can be seen as a direct 
result of a normative use of public choice theory, in that it is attempting to ensure that 
things are efficient and responsive. Privatisation, public choice assumes, provides the 
essential profit motive that ensures competitive delivery of services, as well as the 
associated development and innovation that is thought not to exist in a State 
monopoly. Public choice theorists argue in support of free market delivery models 
that: 
the competitive market place produces goods and services efficiently, whereas monopolies, 
whether public or private, tend towards inefficiency and unresponsiveness This school negates 
48J Donahue The Privatisation Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (Basic Books, New York 1989) 
215. 
49 The issue of why the type of privatisation first mentioned by Donahue was not undertaken in this area 
is discussed in the section of thi s paper titled " Why Limit Privatisation." 
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public ownership and management .......... It claims that the major benefits of contracting out 
public services to private contractors stems from free market competition. 50 
While privatisation may be efficient and responsive, it does not appear to create a 
framework that limits the exploitative problems of self-maximisation as a normative 
use of public choice theory would expect. This is primarily because the assumption is 
that a contract service provider is in the management of penal institutions to make a 
profit. This poses a constitutional challenge of a different kind. 
It can be said that "while government agencies, at least formally are mandated to serve 
the public good, and are responsible to the citizenry, private businesses .. .. . are 
established principally to pursue profits for their owners and investors."51 Many see 
that the roles of profit maker and justice administrator as being in total conflict, 
particularly in the area of reducing re-offending. The concern is that to make a profit, 
private prisons must be full of prisoners, therefore the aim of the private contractor 
can never be to reduce re-offending because this is in direct conflict with the 
motivation to generate profit. The Department of Justice referred to this when it said 
that "a profit orientated prison could have the incentive to make unduly adverse 
reports on parole boards in order to delay release dates, thus grossly interfering with 
the rights of the prisoners. "52 
Using public choice theory to view the group of private contractors created as a result 
of a public choice analysis of the State ' s monopoly, the result is that their profit 
motive amounts to another form of self-maximisation. Just as the self-interest of 
political groups was brought into line economically by the reforms, those of the 
private contractor must be brought into line with the broader goal of reducing re-
offending in the community. 
50 David Shichor Punishment for Profit Private Prisons/Public Concerns (Sage Publications, United 
States of America, 1995) 8. 
51 David Shichor "Private Prisons in Perspective: Some Conceptual Issues" in (1998) 37 The Howard 
Journal 84. 
52 Department of Justice "Submiss ion of to the Ministeria l Committee of Inquiry into the Prisons 
System" (Wellington 1988) Appendix D, 63. 
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VI AGENCYTHEORY 
Agency theory is closely associated with public choice theory because it provides 
another economic analysis that assumes all individuals are rational utility maximisers. 
Agency theory "rests on the notion that social and political life can be understood as a 
series of contracts (or agreed relationships) in which one party, referred to as the 
principal , enters into exchanges with another party, referred to as the agent."53 Agency 
theory is clearly applicable to the penal institution contract management scenario 
where without any disguise the private contract manager is clearly an agent of the 
State. If the goal of the principal (in this case the State) is reducing re-offending and 
the goal of the agent is to maximise profits, then the bringing of the agents goal into 
line with that of the principal amounts to agency costs. The assumption is that 
reducing re-offending is inconsistent with the profit motive for two reasons. One is 
because it is more costly to rehabilitate than to incarcerate. The other is that the focus 
of a utility maximiser would be to ensure that prisons were full of inmates so to 
generate profits. 54 Bentham considered agency problems as early as 1791 in his 
Panoptican, when he stated a preference to having a manager of a prison in whom 
duty and interest were united.55 
Agency theory suggests that there are gomg to be problems in ensunng the 
commitment of entrepreneurial prison contractors is in meeting societal goals such as 
reduction in re-offending and providing a fair or equitable service, even if it is not the 
most profit generating approach. It appears that those who drafted the Penal 
Institutions Amendment Act 1994 did so with concerns regarding the profit motive in 
mind. The Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 can be seen as going some way 
towards ensuring that the profit motive of the private contractor is brought into line 
53 Jonathan Boston above n 6, 4. 
54 In actuality the level of crime and incarceration would appear to be growing at a level where even if 
private prisons were successfully rehabilitating inmates, that there is no question that there would be 
demand in order for them to supply. 
55 James Theodore Gentry "The Panoptican Revi sited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons" 
(1986) 96 YaleLJ 353,353. 
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with the community's interest in reducing re-offending and ensuring the rights of 
inmates are not sacrificed. 
A The Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 
The Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 states that a management contract must 
ensure training is to be provided to staff members of a contract managed institution to 
a standard no lower than that in a penal institution run by the Department of 
Corrections and at the cost of the contractor. 56 There are requirements for Contractors 
to act in line with provisions of the State Sector Act 1988, Penal Institutions Act 1954, 
the regulations and any operational standards. 57 There are reporting requirements 
placed on the Contractor which include reports on programs provided for inmates ( one 
would presume these would be rehabilitative in nature). 58 These statutory requirements 
aim to ensure rehabilitation and reducing re-offending are part of the private 
contractors statutory duty. 
It can be argued that the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 tries not only to 
ensure the goal of reducing re-offending is not lost in the private contractor' s aim for 
profit, but also that the rights of inmates are not forgotten. A private management 
contractor must comply with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1991 and the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 59 There are also 
obligations to report on all incidents in an institution that include violence.60 
Public choice theory suggests that there will need to be strict monitoring of the 
compliance with these statuary obligations or they may be lost in the drive to self-
maximise profits. The Penal Institutions Amendment Act provides for Monitors to 
56 Section 4B(4)(c) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954. 
57 Section 4B(5)(d) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954 and Section 4B (5)(a) of the Penal Institutions 
Act 1954. 
58 Section 4F(2)( d) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954. 
59 Section 4B(5)(b) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954 and Section 48(5)( c) of the Penal Institutions Act 
1954. 
60 Section 4F(2)( c) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954. 
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inspect privately run institutions and ensure compliance with statutory and other 
obligations. 6 1 The profit motive is therefore brought into line with the State's goal of 
reducing re-offending by the statutory regime in the Penal Institutions Amendment 
Act, but not without agency costs for the Department in the nature of monitoring 
compliance. 
B To profit or not to profit.. .? 
The profit motive in penal institution management is therefore oddly placed as both 
the reason why penal institution management was privatised, and the reason why 
agency costs are incurred. The profit motive is the essential component in 
privatisation, introduced to ensure efficiency, responsiveness and innovation, but also 
arguably in direct conflict with the State' s goal of reducing re-offending. 
Those in support of the State ' s continued delivery of penal institution management in 
a monopoly enviromnent, often point to the State ' s lack of profit motive as the very 
reason why only the State can deliver penal institution management in a fair way. The 
argument is significant because it is in direct contradiction with the reasons for 
privatisation described by public choice theory. Dilulio argues that the "the public 
interest" or the "common good" requires that prisons be administered and managed by 
govermnent employees. 62 He believes that aim of prisons should not be the pursuit of 
profit, but that they should be "administered on behalf of the community and in the 
name of civility and justice."63 His viewpoint assumes that profit and justice are 
indeed mutually exclusive. Logan on the other hand suggests that the profit motive 
need not necessarily condemn privatisation because he sees it as a better motive than 
many others. He states that: 
Of various possible motivations for serving as an agent of punishment, the profit motive is 
among the most benign. Compare for example, some alternative motives: self-righteousness, 
enjoyment of power, sadism, vengefulness, zealotry, adventurism, or displacement. No one has 
6 1 S4G of the Penal Institutions Act 1954. 
62 Charles Logan above 117 1, 51. 
63 Charles Logan above 1171 , 52. 
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proposed that all criminal sanctions be administered by unpaid volunteers motivated by pure 
love of justice. If someone does propose it, watch out! Great injustices are often done in the 
name of noble sounding values. 64 
There have in fact been some examples of exactly what Logan fears. There is a prison 
in Northern Queensland that is run specifically for Aboriginal inmates by an 
Aboriginal trust group at the Aurukun Community Corrections Centre. There is a 
women's prison run in New York by the Volunteer Association of America, and a 
women's prison in Chile run by the Order of the Good Shepherd nuns. If we accept 
that those involved in the running of these institutions are indeed utility maximising 
individuals then their interest in the running of the institution must be to serve their 
own interests, perhaps leading to some of the fears expressed by Logan. It is the 
writer's suggestion that the motives of those not driven by profit but by altruism, only 
become "frightening" when viewed from the public choice perspective. Considering 
the altruistic motives of non-profit organisations from other viewpoints does not 
suggest the same sinister outcome. 
C Concluding on Agency Theory 
What seems ironic about the introduction of privatisation is that private contractors 
require a framework to channel their self-maximisation into the interests of the public 
good in the same way public choice theory assumes public servants do. To this extent 
privatisation was not a normative solution to the problems identified by a positive 
analysis of the State monopoly because private providers can also be identified as self-
maximising individuals. This suggests that the introduction of private penal institution 
management was aimed at the economic goals of cost saving and efficiency rather 
than the advancement of other social goals. However agency theory and the Penal 
Institutions Amendment Act 1994 aim to ensure that those societal goals are not lost. 
For the writer the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 goes a considerable way 
towards ensuring that the profit motive does not create as large a problem as those 
who are anxious about it would suggest. 
64 Charles Logan, "The Propriety of Proprietary Prisons", in [ 1987] Federal Probation 3 7. 
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Vll JS PRIVTISATON EFFICIENT AND COST EFFECTIVE? 
This section looks at whether privatisation does in fact offer the cost effectiveness and 
efficiency that public choice theory suggests it will. Before looking at the 
comparative studies that have been undertaken between public and private delivery of 
penal institution management overseas, consideration must be given to some factors 
sunounding these studies. The first significant point is that for every study that is 
verified by one group there is another group that points out its inaccuracies. Secondly 
there is some debate about whether accurate economic comparisons can in fact be 
undertaken because of the large difference between public and private delivery 
structures. Finally what the writer has been alluding to through out this paper is also 
shown in these studies, that is that while it is possible to measure and compare outputs 
it is difficult, arguably impossible, to compare and measure outcomes because their 
qualities are not easily quantified. 
A Cost Effective Outputs 
The majority of studies to date have focused on comparatives of costs, amounting in 
the writer' s view to an analysis of the cost effectiveness of outputs. Arguably the 
United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) has undertaken the most 
significant study to date. 65 By looking at five earlier studies which compared 
operational costs and quality of service at private and public correctional facilities in 
California,66 Texas,67 New Mexico,68 Tennessee,69 and Washington70 the GAO study 
65 Government Accounting Office "Private and Public Prison: Studies Comparing Operational Costs 
and/or Quality of Service" Letter Report I 6.8.96GAO/GGD-96-158 
at<http: //www.securitymanagement.com/ library/000231 .htrnl 
66 Dale K Secherst and David Shichor " Final Report: Exploratory Study of California's Community 
Corrections Facilities" (California State University, San Bernadino, 1994) 
67 Texas Sunset Advisory Commission "Final Repo1t Information Report on Contracts for Corrections 
Facilities and Services" Recommendations to the Governor of Texas and Members of the Seventy-
second Legislature (Austin, 1991) 
68 Charles H Logan " Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement In a Public and a Private Prison 
National Institute of Justice- A Report to the National Institute of Justice" (1991) 
at<http: //www.ucc.uconn.edu/-wwwsoci/nmexsum.html 
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concluded that it could not draw any conclusions about cost saving. It stated that the 
five studies provided little information that was applicable to various correctional 
settings because factors differ widely in terms of correctional philosophy, economic 
factors , and inmate population characteristics. One of the fundamental problems it 
found was that the comparative of real private prisons with hypothetical public 
institutions was very difficult. 71 What the GAO study concludes is that the 
comparisons of operational costs indicated little difference and mixed results. Logan 
who was the researcher in the New Mexico found the GAO study to be so 
"consistently one-sided and negative that it reaches the point of dishonesty."72 While 
Logan's words are probably too strong, the results of the GAO study are somewhat 
surprising when individually each of the five studies suggested that there was at least 
some cost saving associated with private prisons. 
An English comparative study that was undertaken has concluded that "on average, 
privately operated prisons offered an operational cost saving of 8-15% in 1996-7, 
depending on the cost measure used. 73 An Australian comparative has had similar 
results in Queensland, where at Borallon Correctional Centre a study indicated that 
"cost savings in 1992/3 of approximately 10% per prisoner, when compared with 
Lotus Glen Correctional Centre."74 These results are selected from a multitude of 
studies that reflect the same type of results in relation to cost. In the light of these the 
writer accepts that private prisons can operate more cost effectively than public 
69 Tennessee Legislature Fiscal Review Committee "Cost Comparison of Correctional Centres" 
(Nashville, 1995) 
70 Department of Corrections "Privatization Feasibility Study Report" State of Washington Legislative 
Budget Committee (Olympia, 1996). 
71 This is considered by others to be the only possible way that an accurate comparison can be made. 
72 Logan Critique of GAO Report On Private Prisons Letter to the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S House of Representatives (2.9.96) 
http: //www.ucc.uconn.edu/-wwwsoci/gaochl.html 
at< 
73 Jo Woodridge " Review of Comparative Costs and Performance of Privately and Publicly Operated 
Prisons" Prison Research Report, Offenders and Corrections Unit, Research and Statistics Directorate, 
Home Office, No 3 December l 997 . 
74 S Macionis "Contract Management in Corrections: the Queensland Experience" in Moyle, P (ed) 
Private Prisons and Police: Recent Australian Trends (Pluto Press, Australia, 1994) 179-93. 
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prisons, but qualifies this by saying that cost saving alone is not enough if quality is 
low. 
B Measuring Quality 
The GAO study found that compansons based on quality also provided no clear 
results. This lack of clarity about whether quality is sacrificed in the drive for cost 
savmgs is one of the pragmatic arguments used by those who do not support 
privatisation. Comparing quality amongst prisons creates considerable problems, 
firstly because of the difficulty of establishing what amounts to a good prison and, 
secondly in establishing who provides a better judge of quality, the inmate or the 
officer who works in the institution. That said quality of regimes and conditions 
studies are more common than comparisons of rehabilitation and recidivism which are 
considered ambitious and difficult. 
In Logan ' s New Mexico study, quality was measured by questioning staff and inmates 
about eight aspects of penal institution management which were: security, safety, 
order, care, activity, justice, conditions and management. On the results of the inmate 
surveys alone, the State prison outscored the private on every dimension except 
activity. Looking at staff surveys, the private prison easily and consistently outscored 
the State prison. In another American study looking at matters such as conditions of 
confinement, internal security, social adjustment and management "for a substantial 
majority of these performance indicators, the privately operated facilities had at least a 
small advantage."75 The problem is that any survey that involves collecting the views 
of i1m1ates and staff, is unlikely to be useful unless all those involved have worked or 
been detained in a variety of institutions, therefore providing some grounds for 
comparison. It is fair to say evidence of quality improvement is not yet conclusive 
and to that extent can not be said to be better that that provided by the State, though 
there is no clear indication that it is indeed worse. 
75 HP Hatry, P J Brownstein, and R B Levinson "Comparison of Privately and Publicly Operated 
Corrections Facilities in Kentucky and Massachusetts" in Keith Bottomley and Adrian L James above n 
60,262 . 
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C The Difficulty with Outcomes 
Outcome is defined in the Public Finance Act 1989 as "impacts on, or consequences 
for, the community of the outputs or activities of the government." In a prison 
management context, recidivism and rehabilitation amount to desirable outcomes. 
The one study that the writer has been able to locate on recidivism produces more 
inconclusive results. The study compared the recidivism rates at private and public 
prisons in Florida over a 12-month period.76 It found that 10% of the private facility 
releases were rearrested compared to 19% of those released from a public prison. 
Only 6% of the private prison releases were re-sentenced as compared to 10% of their 
public matches. In terms of incarceration 10% of private prison releases were re-
incarcerated within 12 months, while 14% of the public prison releases were re-
incarcerated. One would need considerably more evidence than this one study b~fore 
accepting that private prisons have a lower recidivism rate. Clearly the results of this 
are nowhere near conclusive, and the shyness of researchers in measuring outcomes 
reiterates that their unquantifiable nature is difficult to measure. 
76 JO Lonn Lanza- Kaduce and Karen F. Parker "A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releases from 
Private and Public Prisons in Florida" ( Project Private Corrections, University of Florida, 1998) at< 
http ://web. crim. utl .ed u/pcp/research/tla. htm I 
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VIII WHY LIMIT PRIVATISATION? 
Having addressed the genesis of privatisation, its cost effectiveness and efficiency, the 
writer now asks why privatisation was limited to the contracting out of penal 
institution management rather than full privatisation. Paradoxically a public choice 
theory argument can also be used to describe the limitations placed on the 
privatisation of correctional services as well as those for why it took place. 
A Collective Action and Pure Public Goods 
The problems associated with collective action provide an economic analysis of why a 
fully viable privatised free market delivery of Corrections did not take place. One 
would assume that public choice theorists see a traditional State provision of the 
administration of justice as a symptom of the failure of the free market. Yet the 
problems associated with collective action provide an economic interpretation of why 
the State has traditionally delivered penal institution management. 
Adam Smith was an avid supporter of the free market serving the best interests of 
individuals through unfettered private interest seeking. He identified in his Wealth of 
Nations three areas where the free market fails to deliver. 77 Those three areas are 
national defence, the administration of justice, and the establishment and maintenance 
of certain public works. In economic terms these amount to pure public goods. There 
is no natural market for pure public goods because of two inherent characteristics.78 
Firstly a pure public good has non-rival consumption, meaning that the consumption 
of the goods by one individual does not diminish the consumption of the amount 
available to other consumers. The other characteristic is that a pure public good is 
non-excludable, in that once it is provided to one individual it is impossible to prevent 
77 Adam Smith Wealth of the Nations (Modern Library, New York, 1991). In Smith 's view the 
invisible hand of the free-market guided individuals. Whereas the State was seen as an iron fist that 
crushed the benefits of free-market delivery. 
78 Some commentators claim that there are three elements of pure public good. The third element of 
non-rejectability, meaning that the individual can not abstain from consumption of the good even if they 
want to, appears to be merely the direct converse of non-excludability. 
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other individuals from also consummg it. 79 The prisoner's dilemma game theory 
matrix and its description of the free-rider can be used to demonstrate why the iron fist 
of the State need intervene in the delivery of pure public goods. 80 
B The Prisoner 's Dilemma 
The aptly named prisoner's dilemma is an economic game theory used to describe the 
problems associated with collective action. The game theory derives its name from a 
scenario where two suspects are taken into custody and placed in separate cells so that 
they are unable to communicate with one another. The police officer on duty is 
certain that they are both guilty of armed robbery but she knows she does not have 
adequate evidence to have them convicted. The police officer offers each prisoner 
two alternatives; confess to the crime, or not confess. While these look like the 
alternatives faced by any arrested person, the stakes change when the police officer 
goes on to described the consequences of accepting either of these alternatives. 
The police officer states that if both of the offenders do not confess, the consequence 
will be that they will both be booked on a minor trumped-up charge of theft and 
illegal possession of a weapon and are likely to receive only one year in prison each. If 
both confess, the prison officer will recommend that both get an 8-year sentence as an 
alternative to the 10-year maximum. Alternatively if only one of them confesses, but 
the other does not, the prisoner who confesses will receive only 3 months in prison, 
while the prisoner who did not confess will get the full 10 year maximum. These 
outcomes can be illustrated in the following matrix: 
79 Richard R Barnett " Preference Revelation and Public Goods" in Peter M Jackson Current issues in 
Public Sector Economics (Macmillan, Hong Kong, 1993) 94. 
80 The description that follows is loosely based on what was the first articulation of the model by Luce 
and Raffia in Games and Decisions (Wiley, New York, 1957). 
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Prisoner 2 
Not confess Confess 
1 Oyears for P 1 
Not Confess 1 year each 3 months for P2 
Prisoner 1 
3 months Pl 
Confess 10 years for P2 8 years each 
The matrix shows that the dominant strategy for each individual is to confess because 
no matter how the other prisoner responds the outcome is always better than if they do 
not. The dominant strategy of the individual is not the same as the dominant strategy 
for the group. The dominant strategy for the group is that both prisoners do not 
confess, in which case they would only receive one year each. 
To act in support of the dominant strategy of the group is to act in direct contradiction 
to what is in the prisoner's best interests as an individual. To act for the group, of 
which the individual is also a member, would require the utility maximiser to act 
irrationally. The problem for the group is that if both utility maximising individuals 
act in their own interests (as rationality would suggest) they will each get eight years 
which is the worst outcome for the collective group and the second worst for the 
individual. This is the prisoner' s dilemma. 
I Application to the Administration of Justice 
The prisoner's dilemma matrix , can be used to explain the reasons why individuals 
and in turn the free market can not provide for the administration of justice. By 
replacing the years in the matrix with potential outcomes for money invested, the 
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dilemma transfers to the delivery of a public good for a collective group. If there was 
a free market delivery of the administration of justice, an individual acting to 
maximise their self-interest would not contribute to the cost of the administration of 
that public good because to do so would be to act irrationally, hence individuals tend 
to free ride. 
2 The Free-rider 
The free-rider represents the utility max1m1smg individual acting rationally in a 
collective action problem associated with the delivery of pure public goods. The free-
rider realises that if they do not contribute to the cost of delivering the administration 
of justice (the dominant group strategy) they will still receive the benefit of it because 
of its non-excludable and no-rival elements. The free-rider can therefore receive the 
benefit of a private delivery of the administration of justice whether or not they 
actually pay for it (the dominant individual strategy). The rational decision is 
therefore not to pay, but the reality is that if all individuals act to maximise their own 
individual interests then as a group the service will not be provided. 
Hence public choice theory tells us that as a pure public good the administration of 
justice would not be provided for by the free market because of the problems of the 
associated with the free-rider and collective action. This provides the basis of the 
economic reasoning that lead to the conclusion that there must be a limitation on 
privatisation of the administration of justice with the funding remaining with the State 
through taxation. The model of administration of justice provided by Smith does not 
make any clear distinction between the funding and providing of the administration of 
justice, which leads the writer to consider whether penal institution management is 
part of the administration of justice in economic terms. 
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IX IS PENAL INSTITUTION MANAGEMENT PART OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE? 
From a public choice perspective one has to assume that what amounts to the 
"administration of justice" in the way Smith described is only those aspects of the 
administration of justice that can not be provided in the free market, and are 
vulnerable to the free-rider problem. Smith believed that the State should only be 
involved in the delivery of services that could not be delivered in the free market, 
therefore restricting its involvement to the delivery of pure public goods. The current 
privatisation of penal institution management on an international scale provides 
evidence that penal institution management is not a pure public good in the economic 
sense. 
A Splitting the Iron Fist 
The funder/provider split that has seen the separation of the delivery of corrections 
services including penal institution management from the funding of these services. 
This means the administration of justice as a pure economic public good is reduced to 
the funding side of the equation. Speculation that there would be a full privatisation of 
penal institution management including the funding of such endeavours seems to be 
dismissed by the problems of collective action. When Dianne Yates made the 
comment that "this Bill is definitely about the total privatisation of the prison system 
in this country. As my colleagues have said, when it will stop?"8 1 it must have 
reflected the concerns of many. The clear answer to this question from a public 
choice perspective is that it will stop when individuals are asked to pay for their own 
corrections management other than through taxation. However the writer believes 
that Dianne Yates made the statement with another economic solution to the problems 
of collective action in mind, namely the user pays model. Isolating groups that are 
directly effected by the issue of penal institution management and requiring them to 
pay for the delivery of the service may get around the problem of the free-rider but 
provides some inequitable and unfair results. The fact that an economic models such 
81 29 November 1994 NZPD 5060. 
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as user pays creates some absurd results in the area of penal institution management 
suggests that a pure economic model can not be directly applied to this area. 
B Criminal User Pays 
In the past there have been instances where criminals have been required to pay 
private prison management for their own incarceration. It has been recorded that: 
In medieval England prisons were operated to produce a profit. Prisons belonged to the Crown 
but were sublet to gaolers who were in effect small business operators. Income was generated 
by way of a fee system where by prisoners were charged an ' admission fee ' and a ' release fee' . 
During their period of incarceration prisoners were also required to pay for food , water, bedding 
and other daily necessities- including the temporary release from leg irons! - on a sliding scale 
in accordance with their social standing which was used as a proxy for their capacity to pay.82 
A criminal user pays system sees those able to pay receive the benefit of comforts and 
early release, while those with no income being left to work for the privately run 
institution. 83 The concept of inmates paying for their own incarceration exists today 
where in Broward County Main Jail from "August 15, 1996 the 1500 inmates in the 
main jail began paying $2.00/day for a room with a New River view."84 This type of 
solution to the problems associated with collective action creates to many inequities 
and would leave inmates from lower socio-economic groups in a worse position than 
wealthier inmates. For the writer this type of solution creates a practical dilemma for 
pnsoners. 
82 Allan Brown "Economic (and some non-economic) Aspects of Prison Privatisation in Queensland" in 
papers from the Conference of Economists (Surfers Paradise, 25-28 September 1994) I. 
83 While in New Zealand inmate employment initiatives pick up on the notion of inmate paying towards 
their incarceration, this does not provide the concept of inequity that arises with inmates being required 
to pay for their accommodation based on income and earnings generated outside of the prison 
environment. 
84 Susan W Campbell "The Paying Prisoner- Room with a View at a Price" [1997] American Jails 37 . 
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C Victim User Pays 
The flip side of the criminal paying for the delivery of the services is an even more 
perverse notion of the user pays model. This is where the victim would be required to 
pay for correctional services to avoid the problems associated with collective action. 
The perversion lies in the notion that the victim has already suffered loss and that 
there is something inherently unfair about expecting them to provide for the criminal's 
incarceration. The idea of victim user pays reeks of a natural state without law, where 
individuals fend for themselves and where the rich and the strong would be in a better 
position than the weak and the poor. 
These two examples of the way that the problem associated with the free-rider could 
be sidestepped through economic models reveal the inequities that seem completely 
inappropriate in the delivery of penal institution management. The removal of 
Corrections from the Justice portfolio is a poignant metaphor for the removal of 
Corrections from the administration of justice (in economic terms) the fear is that it 
has also conversely removed the Justice from Corrections. The funder/provider split 
allowed for the avoidance of the inequities of a user pays system and the problems 
associated with collective action. However the fact that funding and providing can 
economically be dissected from one another to get around the problems of collective 
action and the inequities of economic models such as user pays does not mean they 
necessarily should be separated. Isn't penal institution management an inherent role 
of the State and aren't there qualities existing in the State's delivery of penal 
institution management that can not be delivered by other providers? These two 
questions are investigated in the next two sections of this paper. 
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X IS PUNISHMENT AN INHERENT ROLE OF THE STATE? 
Many advocates of the State being the only body to issue punishment have used the 
argument that the right to punish is an inherent role of the State, and therefore can not 
be contacted out to other parties. Laurin Wollan points out that "the perception that 
criminal justice, including the right to punish is inherently and exclusively a function 
of the State, is strongest when it is least closely examined."85 Such a criticism finds 
its origins in the often vague reasons given for the State having an inherent role in the 
delivery of punishment. 
A Arguments in Support of the State's Inherent Role 
The submissions to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on the Penal 
Institutions Amendment Bill can be read to reflect the type of unsubstantiated claims 
often made regarding the reasons for why the State is inherently able to delivery 
punishment. One submission says, "in our view the imprisonment of offenders is a 
core state activity" with no evidence of why this is true. 86 Another states that "it is our 
belief that the task of imprisonment, involving as it does the deprivation of liberty and 
the removal of normal civil rights, is inherently one that should be performed by the 
State alone. "87 
The American Civil Libertarians Union ("ACLU") which is in strong opposition to 
the privatisation of penal institution management in the United Sates of America has 
also made the assertion that imprisonment is one of the "functions which rightfully 
belongs to government."88 However the ACLU inadvertently touched on some of the 
reasons why the State has traditionally been, and in their view should continue to be 
delivered solely by the State when it said that: 
85 Charles Logan Pros and Cons (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990) 58 . 
86 Movement for Alternative to Prison Inc "Submission to Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on 
the Penal Institutions Amendment Bill 1993 (1103) ." 
87 New Zealand Public Service Association "Submission to Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
on the Penal Institutions Amendment Bi! I 1993 (no3)." 
88 Charles Logan above n 71 , 49. 
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The delegation of control and custody of prisoners to private entities, in and of itself, raises 
serious constitutional concerns. Because the deprivation of physical freedom is one of the 
most severe interferences with liberty that the State can impose, and because of civil liberties 
concern created by private management. .. the power to deprive another of his/her freedom 
can not be delegated to private entities. 89 
A closer look at social contract theory suggests that the ACLU may in fact be wrong 
in their assertion that penal institution management "can not be delegated" but that the 
issue appears rather to be that of whether it should be delegated. 
B Social Contract Theory 
Viewing rights from the classical liberal point of view where they are seen to be 
individual not collective in nature, the State is seen as a construct created by a social 
contract between the members of society. In the Hobbesian state of nature (before the 
existence of any such contract) each individual had the right to punish other 
individuals, determining to their own ends the nature and quantity of the punishment 
to be issued.90 Locke's view is that it is the individual's inability as a victim, to 
deliver an unbiased punishment on their own aggressor that drives individuals to 
contract to form a State.9 1 It is to the State that the individual passes their ability to 
punish. This is done on the premise that the State will be able to administer the power 
in a more just way than the individual victim would to his or her own aggressor. In 
Locke's view, the power to punish while delegated to the State still remains with the 
individual. For him: 
Political power is that power which every man having in the state of nature, has given up into the 
hands of the society . ... it can have no other end or measure when in the hands of the magistrates 
but to preserve the members of that society in their lives, liberties, and possessions .... And this 
power has its original only for the compact and agreement and the mutual consent of those who 
make up the community.92 
89 Charles Logan above 1171 , 49. 
9° FB Randall ( ed) Hobbes Leviathan (Washington Square Press, New York, 1969). 
91 J Locke On Civil Government (Henry Reguery, Chicago (original published 1692)). 
92 J Locke above n9 I, 126-7. 
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Locke's contractarian view of the State suggests that the right to punish does not 
originate from the State, but rather that it is transferred to the State from the 
individual's own consortium of rights. The idea that political power remains with the 
individual members of society despite the contract can be used to support two 
diametrically opposed arguments about whether the State can pass on the ability to 
punish to another group. 
One argument is that the State can not contract out the ability to punish, because it has 
been entrusted this role as a trustee for the collective group of individuals. This view 
is based on the idea that the individual rather than the State should decide the passing 
on of what actually belongs to the individual. The Howard League in its evidence to 
the House of Commons Select Committee, on the question of privatisation in Great 
Britain, said that prisons are: 
A public trust to be administered on behalf of the community in the name of justice. To open up 
the way for the private sector into the administration of prisons would undermine the very 
existence of the liberal democratic state.93 
A practical look at the democratic process suggests that this may not be well founded. 
This is because democratically elected representatives of the State make the decision 
to contract out penal institution management by enacting the ability to do so in 
legislation. Ultimately as the representatives of the people, politicians are able to vote 
to pass the legislation that allows for the management of penal institutions to be 
contracted out to a third party. This means the politician as representatives of 
individual members of the community are passing the authority to manage penal 
institutions onto another party. 
The other argument is that the passing of the right to punish onto the State is to view 
it: 
93 Ryan M and Ward T Privatisation and the Penal System: The American Experience and the Debate 
in Britain ( Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1989) 69 . 
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in sho1t [that] the State does not own the right to punish. It merely administers it in trust, on 
behalf if the people and under the rule of law. There is no reason why subsidiary trustees cannot 
be designated, as long as they too are ultimately accountable to the people and subject to the 
same provisions of law that direct the state .94 
This view suggests that as trustees of the right to punish, the State can administer it in 
any way it thinks appropriate so long as it is ultimately responsible. As contracting 
out does not amount to the full passing of equity in penal institution management to 
the private sector, the argument is that the State does indeed remain ultimately 
responsible. The structure created by the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 
sees the State remaining ultimately responsible for the actions of the Contractor to 
which it has passed the ability to administer punishment on their behalf. 
It is difficult to argue that the right to punish can not be passed on to another party. It 
seems clear that indeed it can be. The important issue then is whether in fact penal 
institution management should be contracted out. Aren' t there certain qualities in the 
State ' s delivery of penal institution management that can not be simulated by private 
contractors? 
94 Charles Logan above n 71 , 54. 
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XI QUALITIES EXCLUSIVE TO THE STATE'S DELIVERY OF PUNISHMENT? 
This part investigates whether there is something inherent in the State's delivery of 
punishment that differs from the delivery of punishment from any other group. 
A Fairness 
In his hypothesis on the Anarchist State, Nozick says that there are no collective rights 
and thus the State has no inherent right to manage punishment.95 Despite the clear 
assertion that the State has no inherent right to punish, he identifies something 
"special" about why the State should be delivering punishment. Punishment, he 
suggests can only be justly served if it is administered once and in the exact amount 
deserved. He suggests that a dominant protection agency such as the State has a 
higher degree of entitlement to punish because when it does so it pre-empts the fewest 
others. 96 The State is able to deliver punishment in a fair, quantifiable and predictable 
way that a variety of smaller entities or individuals can not. In his thoughts on the 
prohibition of the private enforcement of justice he identifies that "an independent 
might be prohibited from privately exacting justice because his procedure is known to 
be too risky and dangerous ."97 
Many ofNozick ' s comments can be read to better attach to the role of the State in the 
delivery of the issuing of justice (the court system), yet he makes no such distinction 
between the State's role in the courts and the State's role in administration of 
custodial sentence. Nozick, like many others does not believe that the State's role in 
the varying aspects of the administration of justice can be separated. What concerns 
the writer is that Nozick' s theory does not exclude the possibility of a dominant 
protection agency existing that is not the State. So long as that dominant protection 
agency delivered punishment in a fair, quantifiable, and predictable way then what is 
to stop that delivery being by any monopoly. Interestingly his approach reinforces that 
a monopoly should exist, but does not suggest that there is any quality that means that 
95 Robert Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basil Blackwell , Oxford, 1968). 
96 Nozick above n 95 , 89 . 
97 Nozick above n 95 , 88 . 
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that dominant agency need be the State. So if any dominant agency can deliver 
punishment a fair way, then what other reasons are there for why the State has 
traditionally delivered penal institution management? 
B Crimes are against the State 
The punishment of individuals who harm others is considered in modem society to be 
a public function because it is against laws made by the State that the crime has taken 
place. Those who advocate for private prisons draw a distinction between the 
decision to punish and the meting out of that punishment. They suggest that it is only 
the determination to punish that need remain with the State. Those critical of 
privatisation see that the roles of the Judge, the police officer and the prison officer as 
truly public in nature and interrelated in such a way that they can not be separated and 
dealt with by different bodies. There is a sense of coherence in a State monopoly 
delivery of all of the administration of justice that is lost when aspects are subject to 
privatisation. The concern is that with the loss of coherency comes a loss of power 
and validity. 
The concern with the State ' s essential role being reduced to that of the Judge alone is 
that the criminal is not serving a sentence with the State, for a crime against the State. 
If the notion of a prison is reduced to a non-consensual term in a hotel rather than time 
served for the crime committed against the State, then the power of punishment as a 
concept begins to become blurred. The comment has been made that "both Security 
firms and hotel operations are common place in the private sector: it may be an 
oversimplification but a prison . . . involves little more that a combination of the two 
talents."98 This comment is made in total disregard of any significance in crimes 
being against the State and the power that notion may have as a deterrent to crime. It 
is undeniable that there is more to management of a penal institution than security and 
hotel skills. The reduction of penal institution management to these two commercial 
functions suggests there is no debt owed to the State and therefore not debt to the 
98 Adam Smith Institute- Omequa Justice Policy AS[ (Research) Ltd, (London, l 984)in Stephan Shaw 
"The Short History of Prison Privatisation" in the ( 1991) 87 Prison Service Journal 30 . 
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community as a group when a crime is committed. There is a real sense that if the 
State is not administering penal institution management that the notion of crimes 
being against the State is lost. If it is lost altogether there remains little to stop 
individuals undertaking their own punishment on the premise that the crime is against 
them as an individual rather than as an individual represented by the State. 
Privatisation can therefore be seen to individualise crime in a way that a State 
monopoly does not. Privatisation can be seen to chip away at the notion of laws being 
made by the State and representing the interest of the collective group. 
C Symbolism 
The issue of crime against the State is closely tied to the issue of symbolism in the 
State's delivery of penal institution management. Many who are critical of 
privatisation are concerned with its symbolism. There is an argument that the State as 
delivery of the administration of justice provides a symbol of public good. Those who 
support privatisation believe that this is an argument of little practical importance in 
the day to day management of penal institutions because the issue of who administers 
punishment makes no difference to the nature, impact, or effect of the sentence. That 
view relies on the separation of the State's differing roles in the administration of 
justice, and assumes that the prisoners and the community alike have no real interest 
in who administers a sentence of punishment. For Ira Robbins, the symbol of the 
State is hugely significant as demonstrated by his comment that: 
When it enters a judgement of conviction and imposes a sentence, a court exercises its authority, 
both actually and symbolically. Does it weaken that authority however- as well as the integrity 
of a system of justice - when an inmate looks at his keepers uniform and, instead of encountering 
an emblem that reads " Federal Bureau of Prisons" or "State Department of Corrections" he faces 
one that says "Acme Corrections Company?99 
The argument is that the idea of profiting from punishment can be seen to impact on 
the symbolic nature of punishment by the State and potentially reduces its credibility 
in the eyes of the community. Many believe that "for State power to preserve 
99 Charles Logan above 1171, 56. 
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legitimacy it was essential that it remain untainted by the stain of commerce."' 00 The 
fact that private companies delivering penal institution management are on the share-
market and are visibly profiting from the incarceration of individuals can be seen to 
impact on the powerful symbolism of the State as the administrator of justice. There 
is an unpleasantness in the notion of incarceration being an area from which 
individuals should profit, and the motives of private providers can be subject to 
question by those who do not subscribe to the economic justifications of privatisation. 
The concern is that the very association of profiteering from incarceration inspires 
distrust and scepticism in the punishment system, because it suggests that goals such 
as rehabilitation run second to profit, and that the State does not consider the 
administration of justice impo1iant. There does appear to be something to the notion 
that the State as a body representing the community is reduced somewhat by 
privatisation of penal institution management. The constitutional relationship 
between the State and the citizen comes into question as does the very purpose of the 
State. The question arises what the impact of privatisation will be in the future if the 
coherent symbol of the State as justice administrator is somewhat dissolved. The 
practical impact of privatisation will depend greatly on the affect of ideological 
notions of the State on the day to day administration of justice. 
100 Mick Ryan "Some Liberal and Radical Responses to Privatising the Penal System in Britain" in 
" Private Sector and Community Involvement in the Criminal Justice System" (Proceedings from a 
Conference Wellington, 30 November and l December 1992) 11. 
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XII CONCLUSION 
The framework of public choice theory offers an explanation for the reforms in the 
area of penal institution management. The reforms within the Department of 
Corrections can be seen to fit neatly within the broader reforms of the state sector in 
New Zealand. They do so without raising constitutional questions about the 
relationship existing between the State and its citizens, but in clear denial of a notion 
of public good existing naturally in the motivation of State employees. It is that very 
notion which provides the basis for arguments supporting the State's continued 
monopoly delivery of penal institution management and in fact the entire 
administration of justice. The absolutist assumptions of public choice theory about 
self maximising individuals means a public choice view of penal institution 
management disregards all inquantifiable notions such as the importance of 
symbolism or the greater public good. Privatisation stretches the very notion of what 
the State ' s role is in administering justice and punishment, and can be seen to chip 
away at the coherent and arguably powerful concept of the State. 
When the State does not delivery penal institution management there is an anxiety that 
things will not be fair or equitable for inmates because private prisons are run for 
profit. It must be conceded that there is some tension (at least theoretically) that exists 
between the financial interest of contractors and the public interest in the reduction of 
re-offending. The reality is that it is extremely complex to pinpoint this as the exact 
reason why a State monopoly delivery of penal institution management should 
continue. It is almost a moral dilemma that lies at the basis of concerns about a 
private entity delivering penal institution management, and in economic terms moral 
arguments are meaningless. Yet there are real issues to be considered regarding the 
continued constitutional relationship of citizen and the State in terms outside the 
economic, including the notion of crime being against the State and the associated 
symbolism. It may not be the immediate threat of the profit motive that causes 
concern in the long term, but the threat to the symbol of the State and the relationship 
of individuals to that symbol. 
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In the context of penal institution management public choice has been helpful when 
turned upon the contractor to ensure that their profit motive is controlled. A practical 
use of agency theory in the guise of the Penal Institutions Amendment Act 1994 
provides a way of reducing the tension of profit and fairness to some degree. Only 
time will tell if the monitoring and compliance regime will be adequate both in terms 
of ensuring fairness and also in economic terms. The writer contends that fears about 
the profit motive may be less significant in the short term than many believe because 
the legislative framework for privatisation in New Zealand creates clear and 
enforceable obligations. 
Agency theory and public choice theory, it can be argued, have channelled the 
interests of the contractor and bureaucrats into the broader goals of the Department of 
Corrections. In the context of penal institution management the goal of reducing re-
offending can be seen to be both an economic and social good. To that end public 
choice theory may have inadvertently protected a public good it would itself deny to 
be in existence. 
When public choice theory is used in a normative way to control the down side of 
self-maximisation it actually acts to preserve interests outside of the economic in the 
instance of penal institution management. The problem is that used as a positive tool, 
public choice theory finds fault in aspects of the machinery of government that were 
specifically built to protect the public good rather than deliver cost efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. In this respect the use of public choice theory can be seen to have taken 
penal institution management full circle. 
The writer suggests that public choice theory because of its absolutist assumption that 
all individuals are self maximising, can be used over and over to constantly identify 
problems in frameworks that it has itself created. Despite this circular effect, the 
theory can be argued to have introduced frameworks that will bring efficiency, cost 
effectiveness and innovation. What the writer sees as the real dilemma for prisoners 
and citizens alike, is the long term possibility that the loss of the coherent symbol and 
hence strength of the State, may have a lasting impact on the constitutional 
relationship between citizen and State. Public choice theory does not provide the 
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appropriate mechanism to consider these long-term effects. It may therefore be the 
long-term impact on the State rather than the short-term threat of the profit motive that 
creates the real prisoners' dilemma. 
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